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Abstract:
This paper analyzes the situation, structure and performance of broiler production.  The inherent
interdependence in broiler production is high transactions costs. Two types of transactions costs,
asset specificity with uncertainty and high information costs, are identified and explored.  The
performances of the alternative structures, vertical integration and vertical coordination, are
outlined.  In broiler production, vertical coordination is preferred by both firms and growers
because it minimizes transactions costs.  These conclusions are extended to other agricultural
commodities, using pork and rice as examples.  13 pages.1
I.  INTRODUCTION
The predominance of contract production in the broiler industry offers an excellent
example for analyzing organizational structure.  This paper will begin with a statement of the
primary hypothesis which will be tested with theory and empirical data.  Then a brief overview of
the broiler industry will outline the assets and activities provided by each party. Finally, the
interdependencies of the broiler industry will be presented and analyzed using the Situation,
Structure, and Performance (SSP) Paradigm (Schmid 1987).
SSP is a paradigm for relating institutional alternatives to performance.  The paradigm
provides a connection between alternative institutions, property rights, or rules of the game and
the performance resulting from these different alternatives.  The key components of the paradigm
are situation, structure, and performance (SSP).  The situation classification uses the attributes of
the good to identify interdependencies.  The structure is alternative institutions.  Simply stated,
the performance is who gets what.  Measurements of performance vary depending on the good. 
One example is income distribution.  The key to SSP analysis is given a good with certain
characteristics, alternative institutions will result in different performances.
Hypothesis: Where transactions costs are high in agricultural production, both farmers 
and processing firms prefer vertical coordination over vertical integration in the 
production of agricultural goods.
This paper will show that in agricultural markets, vertical coordination is the structure that
is chosen to deal with interdependencies due to high transactions costs.  The broiler industry is
used as an example because it is the most deeply coordinated industry and historic data is2
available on contracts and other relevant variables. However, the trend toward vertical
coordination is apparent in other commodities, such as hogs and grains.
The terms vertical integration and vertical coordination are often used interchangeably. 
However, the two structures differ significantly.  Vertical integration is defined as the ownership
of the production of a previously purchased input used in the manufacturing of an output or the
ownership of a production unit that previously had purchased the output from a particular firm
(Kilmer 1986). The key to vertical integration is asset ownership.  However, vertical integration is
only one of many possible types of vertical structures.  Vertical coordination is a more
comprehensive structure and includes all means of vertically harmonizing production, processing,
and distribution activities.  In this paper, the vertical integration structure refers to firm ownership
of all aspects of broiler production.  The vertical coordination structure refers to the use of
production contracts in broiler production.
II.  OVERVIEW OF BROILER INDUSTRY
Integration and production contracts in the broiler industry began in the 1930's in the
south and evolved to their current form by the mid 1950's. By the mid 1950's, contracting grew to
dominate the industry, eliminating the short lived success of the poultry auctions, which emerged
in the 1950's. Thus, the integrated structure seen today was in place by the 1960's (Sawyer 1971).
In broiler contract production, the processing firm provides the young chicks, feed,
poultry science and other technical support, and delivery and pick up of the chickens.  Firms use
field supervisors to oversee production units.  Typically, the supervisor visits each unit once a
week. The grower provides the physical structure in which the chickens are housed, the waste3
disposal facility, and the labor for the feeding, cleaning of the structure, and other day to day care
of the chickens. The grower is paid per pound of live broiler produced and the contracting period
is usually three years. The contracts also have an incentive program, paying a bonus for above
average relative performance and penalizing for below average relative performance.
Contracting accounts for approximately 92 percent of broilers produced.  The remaining 8
percent are raised on firm-owned farms (USDA 1988).  The remainder of the paper will focus on
the differences between vertical integration and vertical coordination.  The analysis will address
the question why is contracting the dominate choice in broiler production?
III.  SSP ANALYSIS OF THE BROILER INDUSTRY
A.  SITUATION
In terms of the SSP paradigm, the good in this case is the broiler grown for processing.
The prevailing situational interdependence in the broiler production is high transactions costs. 
Transaction costs are high for both growers and the firm.  The transactions costs can be
categorized into two areas: 1.) Asset specificity and 2.) Information cost. This paper will focus on
two alternative structures, vertical integration and vertical coordination, and their performances.
The following sections present a hypothesis related to each type of transaction costs and discuss
how they affect the grower and the firm.  4
1.  Asset Specificity with Uncertainty
Hypothesis: In the production of agricultural products, farmers and firms will choose 
vertical coordination via production contracts over vertical integration as an institution  
to deal with the problem of highly specific assets under uncertainty. 
This hypothesis is consistent with variations of  Williamson’s basic rule of asset specificity
(Williamson 1989), which states that vertical integration will occur with highly specific assets. 
While total vertical integration does not dominate the broiler industry, it is dominated by vertical
coordination with over 90 percent of production occurring under production contracts.
Both growers and firms face high transactions costs due to asset specificity and
uncertainty.  Assets the growers use in production, the land, broiler housing structure, and waste
disposal facility, are highly specific, immobile assets with little or no alternative uses.  Also, the
individual grower’s cognitive ability is limited and thus, he is unable to process the vast amount of
information needed for production.  Large amounts of information are needed to evaluate and
make decisions in an environment with price volatility, changing consumer tastes and preferences,
and new technologies.
The firm faces the problem of asset specificity in its processing machinery, which has no
other alternative use.  Also, the firm faces uncertainty in broiler supply and the quality and size of
the broilers. A steady and consistent supply of broilers is necessary for the firm to maintain plant
efficiency and meet consumer demand.  Branding and consumer preferences dictate the need for
high quality, while the mechanized processing facility requires a certain size bird.  
Changing consumer tastes and preferences are another type of uncertainty for the firm. 
According to Hirschman (Hirschman 1970), specific assets will not be recovered by other firms if
the firm is dissolved.  Therefore, as consumers change, the firm must “recuperate” itself to meetOther structures, such as a farmer (grower) owned cooperative processing plant, are
1
possible.  However, the analysis of the paper is limited to the two structures, vertical integration
and vertical coordination, that dominate the broiler industry.
Secondary hypotheses are those presented in part A under sections one and two.
2
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these changing needs.  The broiler industry is a good example of firms reinventing their product
line to meet consumer demands.  The industry has gone from the New York dressed fryer, with
feathers off but entrails in and head on, to the “pan ready,” precut fryers (Sawyer 1971) to the
further processed boneless, skinless breasts that are so popular today.   Even the name of the
industry has changed with the environment: from chicken farming to agribusiness to commercial
broiler industry.
2. Information Costs
Hypothesis: Where there are high costs of monitoring production practices, firms will 
choose contracting over firm-owned farms as a means of agricultural production.
Firms must cope with high transactions costs due to the high cost of monitoring
production processes. Contracts with either independent growers or employees are used to deal
with the problem of monitoring.  Firms must also deal with this issue in the processing plant,
however, since the good in question is broilers for processing, the issue of workers in the plant is
not addressed in this paper.
B.  STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE
This section will analyze the two alternative structures , vertical integration and vertical
1
coordination, and the performance from each.  Then empirical studies, which support the primary
and secondary  hypotheses, will be presented. See Exhibit 1 for an abbreviated presentation of the
2
analysis.6
1.  Vertical Integration
Under the vertical integration structure, the firm owns the processing facility and all of the
assets of production, which includes the land, broiler housing structure and waste disposal facility. 
Thus, the transactions costs are reduced by internalizing the production and processing specific
assets.  The uncertainty of supply is eliminated.  Quality and size uncertainty is greatly reduced,
but not totally eliminated due to the high cost of information.  
Information costs are high due to the high cost of monitoring employees in the production
facility.  Since the workers do not own a stake in the product, shirking could be a problem. 
Employee contracting is necessarily incomplete because the firm can not feasibly spell out in the
contract the details of every activity the employee needs to perform.  Thus, the firm has the power
to interpret the contract as it wishes.  An alternative institution to address the issue of shirking is
to build worker identity with the firm (Simon 1991).  This results in workers exerting more than a
minimal effort.  However, worker identification with the firm is difficult to create, especially in
low level, physically intensive positions.
2.  Vertical Coordination
Under the vertical coordination structure, the firm enters into production contracts with
independent growers.  The firm’s transactions costs due to asset specificity are reduced because
while the processing specific assets are internalized in the firm, the risk of ownership of
production specific assets is shifted to the grower.   Thus, a case of  hostages (Williamson 1989)
is created between the firm and grower.  They are hostages because they depend on each other to
eliminate uncertainty and provide a return on investments in large specific assets. However, they
are not mutual hostages because the processing firm holds more power due to the large number of7
growers relative to processors.  The firm’s supply, quality and size uncertainty is greatly reduced
through the production contract.  If the grower does not deliver the specified characteristics, his
contract will not be renewed.
The grower’s uncertainty about prices, consumer tastes, and technology are reduced
through the contract.  The grower is assured a certain price per pound and thus, a predictable,
stable income.  The firm will evaluate, analyze, and disseminate information on changing
consumer tastes and provide education on new technology.  Because each grower has a limited
cognitive ability to collect and analyze information on changes in the market, i.e. consumer tastes,
technology, etc., the contract reduces risks associated with a changing operating environment by
providing information unavailable to him otherwise.  However, the contract does not totally
isolate the grower from risks associated with a changing environment.  
The assertion that vertical coordination reduces transactions costs is supported by Frank
and Henderson (1991).  They use a vertical coordination index incorporating industry nonmarket
relationships and input-output relationships.  This vertical coordination index is used in an
econometric analysis to examine the effects of transactions costs on food industry vertical
linkages.  The types of transactions costs incorporated into the index are asset specificity,
uncertainty, input supplier concentration, and internalization costs.  The empirical analysis
supports that vertical coordination via nonmarket contracts is motivated by transactions costs.
Information and monitoring costs are addressed in the production contract.  The
production contract pays a fixed price per pound produced and is thus, result oriented. They
establish motivation through a system of rewards, both positive and negative, for the grower.  The
contracts specify the reward structure, general production practices, pricing agreement,8
adjustment mechanisms for adverse weather, and many other factors. Thus, farmers who produce
above average will be rewarded both monetarily and through recognition; while farmers who
perform poorly will be penalized monetarily.  Consistently poor performers will not be awarded
additional contracts. 
Knoeber and Thurman (1995) found that production contracts shift risk from the grower
to the processing firm.  They classify risk into three categories: price risk, common production
risk, and idiosyncratic production risk.  Common production risk is risk that is common to all
growers, such as weather.  Idiosyncratic production risk is risk that is specific to one grower, such
as a glitch in an automatic feeding system.
Production and payment data from 75 growers under contract to one firm were obtained. 
Four years of data, 1981 through 1985, were broken into four different periods because of
changes in the contract.  Also, feed and broiler price data were obtained from USDA sources. 
Two model simulations were produced and compared to the actual income variability of
the growers in the sample.  The first model simulated income variability of grower with
nontournament contracts.  In tournament contracts, the actual contracts, the grower is paid based
on relative ranking among other growers rather than absolute ranking among other growers,
which is used in nontournament contracts.  The second model simulated income variability of
independent growers.
The authors produced two significant measurements from the analysis.  First, they found
that price risk is the major component of overall risk.  The pure contribution of price risk is 84
percent of all risk measured by payment variance.  The pure contributions of production and
idiosyncratic risk are 3 percent each.  The remaining 10 percent of risk is a function of9
interactions between the three categories.  Second, in this sample, 97 percent of risk was shifted
from the grower to the firm, since changes in price did not affect the payment to the grower.
However, the use of contracts creates other types of risk for the grower.  Two contracting
risks are important to farmers: 1.) The risk of contract nonrenewal and 2.) The risk of contractors
not keeping chicks in housing units on a regular basis.  Most of the risk of nonrenewal can be
avoided by fulfilling the specifics of the contract.  However, the growers do face some risk of
nonrenewal which they can not reduce by following the exact production practices of the
contract.  These include distance from the processing plant, a change in firm ownership, a change
in environmental regulations, or other factors out of the control of growers.
Demand fluctuations are the primary cause of the risk of contractors not filling the houses
regularly (USDA 1988).  The firm controls the timing and placement of chicks to meet their
market needs.  Placement can occur either quickly or slowly depending on the firm’s needs. These
delays can be costly for growers, especially those with mortgage payments on their housing
structures.
The contracting risks faced by the growers are a tradeoff for shifting price risk to the firm. 
Clearly, the firm holds greater power in the contracting relationship than the grower.  This is a
function of there being many growers who are looking to contract with only a few firms. 
Growers will continue to contract as long as the risk of contracting is perceived to be less than the
price risk.Much of the contract production is in the south, especially North Carolina.  However,
3
growth is slowing in North Carolina due to increased environmental regulations. A significant
amount of production has emerged in Oklahoma where the environmental regulations are not as
strict.  This is an example of the risk of nonrenewal discussed in the previous section.
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IV.  CONCLUSION
The situational interdependence in broiler production is high transactions costs.  Asset
specificity with uncertainty and high information costs are the two types of transactions costs that
affect the industry the most.  Two alternative structures dominate the industry, vertical integration
and vertical coordination.
Over 90 percent of broiler production occurs under contracts, with the remaining
production occurring on firm-owned farms.  By the 1960's, the integrated system of contract
production had evolved and is perpetuated by specific assets with uncertainty coupled with a high
cost of monitoring production practices.  Firms choose contracting because it minimizes their
transactions costs.  Growers choose contracting because it minimizes their transactions costs
while allowing them to maintain ownership of a farm and some independence.
This paper used the broiler industry to examine vertical integration and vertical
coordination.  However, the conclusions can be generalized to other agricultural commodities,
such as pork and rice.  Hog contracting and grain contracting are interesting examples of vertical
coordination because they offer two different examples of contracting.  Hog contracting follows
the traditional model of contracting similar to the broiler industry.  However, in the case of grains,
the contracts often specify production practices in exchange for price premiums.
Contracting similar to the broiler industry is increasing in the pork industry .  The driving
3
force behind this is asset specificity with uncertainty.  Pork processors want to increase11
mechanization, but in order to do so, they must have a standard sized product.  Also, pork
producers must adjust to changing consumer preferences toward leaner pork.  Contracting is one
method to deal with these uncertainties.  However, whether or not contracting will dominate the
pork industry is questionable because growers have the option of a well established pork
commodity market as a risk management tool.  Also, some processors are using price premiums
to signal the product characteristics they want, i.e. leaner hogs.
A different type of contracting has emerged in rice.  Riceland Foods, a farmer owned rice
mill, contracts with Gerber to produce rice for baby food (Greenwalt, Schweikhardt, and Fairly
1995).  Gerber’s business is built on the reputation of high quality, safe products.  Therefore, it
must know the production practices used in growing rice for its baby food.  Riceland provides a
guarantee of production practices and quality in exchange for a price premium.  However, the
farmers purchase all inputs, in accordance with the contract, rather than Gerber providing them.
Vertical coordination is chosen over vertical integration because of its flexibility.  It allows
firms to obtain inputs with specific characteristics without getting into another business (farming)
where large investments in specific assets are required.  Vertical coordination reduces uncertainty
for the farmer and provides a more stable income while allowing him to maintain ownership of his
business.  Future research in this area should focus on different performances of different
types/degrees of vertical coordination.References
Frank, Stuart D. and Dennis R. Henderson.  “Transactions Costs as Determinants of Vertical 
Coordination in the U.S. Food Industries.”  Amer. J. Agri. Econ. 74(November 1992): 
941-950.
Greenwalt, Bert, David B. Schweikhardt, and Mary Helen Fairley.  “Quality and Coordination in 
the Food System: The Case of Riceland Foods.”  Case study, 1995.
Hirschman, Albert O.  Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1970.
Kilmer, Richard L.  “Vertical Integration in Agricultural and Food Marketing.”  Amer. J. Agri. 
Econ. 68(December 1986): 1155-1160.
Knoeber, Charles R.  and Walter N. Thurman.  “Don’t Count Your Chickens. . . : Risk and Risk 
Shifting in the Broiler Industry.”  Amer. J. Agri. Econ.  77(August 1995): 486-496.
Sawyer, Gordon.  The Agribusiness Poultry Industry.  New York: Exposition Press, 1971.
Schmid, A. Allan.  Property, Power and Public Choice.  New York: Praeger, 1987. 
Simon, Herbert A.  “Organizations and Markets.”  J. Econ. Persp. 5(Spring 1991): 25-44.
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. The U.S. Broiler 
Industry.  Agricultural Economic Report Number 591, November 1988.
Williamson, O.E.  “Transaction Cost Economics.”  Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1989.Exhibit 1
SSP OUTLINE FOR THE BROILER INDUSTRY
SITUATION: sources of STRUCTURE: alternative property PERFORMANCE: who gets
interdependence rights, rules of the game, institutions what
TRANSACTION COSTS
Asset Specificity with Uncertainty 1. Administrative hierarchy -
      A. Grower/production vertical integration - firm owned
          ’Land production
          ’Structure
          ’Waste disposal
          ’Price
          ’Changing consumer                  
           tastes and preferences
          ’Technology
      B. Firm/processor
          ’Machinery built for a                
          certain size chickens
          ’Stable supply
          ’Quality
          ’Size
2. Market bargaining - vertical
coordination - production
contracting
1. TC due to asset specificity with
uncertainty are reduced:
production and processing specific
assets are internalized in the firm.
Loss of independent farmer.
2. TC due to asset specificity with
uncertainty are reduced:
processing specific assets are
internalized in the firm, while the
risk of ownership of production
specific assets are shifted to the
farmer.  Farmers could by left with
capital losses.
TRANSACTION COSTS 1. Administrative hierarchy -
Information Cost vertical integration - firm owned
     A. Firm/processor - High                 
      cost of monitoring                           
   production practices
         ’Contractual power - many         
         growers, few firms
  
production 
    a.  Employee contracting
    
     b.  Build worker identity with        
      the firm  
2. Market bargaining - vertical
coordination - production
contracting
1a. Possible workers will “shirk”.
Workers do not own a stake in the
product.
     ’Incomplete contracts - firm     
     holds power to interpret
1b.  Workers exert more than
minimal effort.
2.  Issues of motivation are dealt
with in contract, i.e., positive and
negative incentive structure. 
Workers are owner of part of the
production process.
     ’Result oriented contracts -      
firm holds contractual power